This paper proposes fast elliptic curve multiplication algorithms resistant against side channel attacks, based on the Montgomerytype scalar multiplication. The proposed scalar multiplications can be applied to all curves over prime fields, e.g., any standardized curves over finite fields with characteristic larger than 3. The method utilizes the addition formulas xECDBL and xECADD assembled by only x-coordinates of points, and is applicable for any types of curves over finite fields. Then, we encapsulate two addition formulas into one formula xECADDDBL, which accomplishes a faster computation because several auxiliary variables of two formulas can be shared. We also develop a novel addition chain for the new formula, with which we can compute scalar multiplications. The improvement of our scalar multiplications over previous Coron's dummy operation method is about 18% for a 160-bit scalar multiplication. Our method requires no table-up of precomputed points and it is suitable for the implementation on memory constraint computing architectures, e.g., smart cards. Moreover, we optimize the proposed algorithms for parallelized implementations with SIMD operations. Compared with the similar scheme proposed by Fischer et al., our scheme is about 16% faster.
Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) have become a vital technology. The key length of ECC is currently chosen smaller than those of RSA and ElGamal-type cryptosystems. The small key size of ECC is suitable for implementing on low-power mobile devices like smart cards, mobile phones and PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants, such as Palm and Pocket PC). In fact, they are being standardized by many organizations [3] , [12] , [30] , [36] . Let E(K) be an elliptic curve over a finite field K = F q (q is a power of a prime p). The dominant computation of all ECC algorithms, including encryption/decryption and signature generation/verification primitives, is the scalar multiplication d * P for a point P ∈ E(K) and an integer d. A lot of algorithms have been proposed to enhance the running time of the scalar multiplication [8] , [11] . A choice of coordinate systems and addition chains is the most important factor. Some efficient addition chains use table a look-up method. a) E-mail: izu@labs.fujitsu.com b) E-mail: takagi@informatik.tu-darmstadt.de * A part of the paper is published in [15] - [17] .
It is useful for software implementation but not for smart cards because a size of the memory spaces is constraint and its cost is relatively expensive. Side channel attacks (SCA) allow an adversary to reveal the secret key in a cryptographic device by observing side channel information such as the computing times or the power consumptions [22] , [23] . The adversary does not have to break a physical protection to obtain the secret key. It is a serious attack especially against mobile devices. The simple power analysis (SPA) and the differential power analysis (DPA) are typical examples. SPA only uses a pattern matching, while DPA uses statistic analysis. Implementer should take countermeasures to each of them.
This paper focuses on the scalar multiplication algorithm resistant against side channel attacks, based on the Montgomery-type method. The algorithm utilizes the xcoordinate-only addition formulas, xECADD and xECDBL, which assembles only x-coordinates of points and is an alternative to the text-book formulas for efficient computation. We improve the efficiency by encapsulating two formulas into one new formula xECADDDBL, which simultaneously computes an addition and a doubling of points. Our addition formula yields a faster scalar multiplication because several auxiliary variables of the formulas can be shared. We also develop a novel addition chain for our new formula. The addition chain attains the security against side channel attacks. The efficiency improvement over the previous Coron's dummy operation method is about 18%.
We also develop a fast parallelized scalar multiplication algorithm resistant against side channel attacks with the Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) architecture. SIMD operations are simple so that they have been implemented on several CPUs. The SSE2 for Pentium 4 and 3D Now! for Athlon are examples. Infineon developed a cryptographic coprocessor CRYPTO2000 for smart cards which is able to process a computation in parallel with SIMD operations [10] of ECC, and Fischer et al. proposed a parallelized scalar multiplication algorithm optimized to CRYPTO2000. In this paper, we propose another fast scalar multiplication algorithm resistant against side channel attacks with SIMD operations based on our xECADDDBL. Compared with the algorithms by [1] , [10] , our algorithm is 16% faster.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 prepares mathematical notations and the side channel attacks are introduced in Section 3. Then our algorithm is proposed in Section 4 and Section 5 for a non-parallel circumstance and in Section 6 for a parallel circumstance with SIMD opera- 
Elliptic Curve and Scalar Multiplication
In the followings, we assume that the definition field K is F p (p > 3), i.e., a finite field with prime elements p. An elliptic curve E(K) is defined as follows:
where O is the point of infinity. Every elliptic curve over K is isomorphic to a curve of this form, and we call this equation as the Weierstrass form.
There are several ways to represent points on an elliptic curve (coordinate system). The major coordinate systems are the affine coordinate system A, the projective coordinate system P, and the Jacobian coordinate system J (see [8] for detailed descriptions). In the affine coordinate system, points of the elliptic curve except O are represented as P = (x, y), where x, y are elements of K. Points in P and J are represented with three field elements (X : Y : Z). The representations are equivalent to the affine representation with respect to (x, y) = (X/Y, X/Z) for P and (x,
The number of the points on E(K) is called the order and written as #E(K). The Hasse theorem assures that
The elliptic curves E(K) possess an additive group structure and two points P 1 , P 2 on the curve can be added P 1 + P 2 . The formulas that compute the addition are called the addition formula. Several addition formulas are discussed in the following sections. A scalar multiplication is to compute d * P for a given integer d and a point P ∈ E(K), which is necessary for constructing ECC. A point P and an integer d are called the base point and the scalar, respectively. In ECC specifications, the order of the base point is usually chosen as a large prime number. The system parameters of ECC are as follows: a prime p of the definition field, a base point P = (x, y), a order of the base point #P, a cofactor h = #E(K)/#P, and coefficients of the definition equation a, b. The relevant recommended curves in many standard organizations [3] , [12] , [30] , [36] have cofactor h = 1 and #E(K) is prime.
Standard Addition Formula and Addition Chain
This section describes a standard addition formula and an addition chain, which are required to compute scalar multiplications. An addition formula is a formula with which we can compute an addition of two points of E(K) using the arithmetic in the base field K. An addition chain is a chain of the scalar d for computing the scalar multiplication efficiently.
Let P 1 = (x 1 , y 1 ), P 2 = (x 2 , y 2 ) be two points of E(K) different from O and satisfying P 2 ±P 1 . Then the standard addition formula that computes the addition 
for i=n-2 down to 0 3:
Alg. 1 Add-and-double method.
P 2 , and λ = (3x
We call these formulas as the standard formulas. Especially, we call P 1 + P 2 (P 1 P 2 ) the elliptic curve addition (ECADD) and
, that is 2 * P 1 , the elliptic curve doubling (ECDBL). The computing times for the ECADD and the ECDBL depend on the coordinate system [8] . We summarize the computing times in Table 1 , where M, S, I denotes the computation time of a multiplication, a squaring, and an inverse in the definition field K, respectively. The computational speed of ECADD or ECDBL can be enhanced when the third coordinate in P, J is Z = 1 or the coefficient of the definition equation is a = −3.
Next we explain the addition chain. A standard addition chain utilizes the binary expression of
. Then Alg. 1, which is called the binary method or the add-and-double method, computes d * P efficiently. On average it requires (n−1) ECDBLs + (n−1)/2 ECADDs.
The NAF is another efficient addition chain that requires (n − 1) ECDBLs + (n − 1)/3 ECADDs on average [12] . The NAF utilizes a signed binary d i = −1, 0, 1 (i = 0, 1, ..., n − 1) instead of the binary coefficient. If we are allowed to use extra memory, we can use the enhancement techniques utilizing pre-computed tables. The Brickell's method and the sliding windows methods are two of the standard algorithms [6] . These algorithms have been developed for the efficient modular multiplications over finite fields (we refer to the nice survey paper [11] ). In this paper we are interested in efficient algorithms without table look-up. Our goal is to propose an efficient algorithm that is suitable for smart cards, and the pre-computed table sometimes hinders to achieve the implementation on smart cards because their memory spaces are constraint and their cost is relatively expensive.
Special Elliptic Curves
With a special class of elliptic curves, we can enhance the speed of a scalar multiplication. Okeya-Sakurai used the Montgomery form for a cryptographic purpose [33] . The addition formula of the Montgomery form is much simpler than that of the Weierstrass form, and its scalar multiplication is also faster. However every Montgomery form cannot be generally converted to the Weierstrass form, because the order of the Montgomery form curves is always divisible by 4 .
ECC has been standardized in several organizations like ANSI, IEEE, SEC, NIST, WAP. In all standards, the curves are defined by the Weierstrass form over F p or F 2 m , where p is a prime number or m is an integer. The example curves over F p cannot be represented by the Montgomery form. Indeed, all curves in [3] , [30] and all curves defined over a prime field with larger than 160-bit prime in [12] are not compatible.
Side Channel Attacks
Side channel attacks (SCA) are attacks in which an attacker observes side channel information (computing time and power consumption) in an cryptographic device and guesses an secret information in it without breaking the device physically. If there is a dependency between the secret information and the side information, the information can be revealed. If the implementation is naive or careless, SCA really is a serious attack. The timing attack (TA) and the power analysis attack are examples of SCA [22] , [23] . The simple power analysis (SPA) only uses a single observed information, while the differential power analysis (DPA) uses a lot of observed information together with statistic tools. In this paper, we only discuss SPA and DPA because TA can be regarded as a class of SPA.
SPA and Countermeasures
SPA uses a single observation. The attack is based on a direct connection between the power consumption and the secret information (secret key) in the device. We have to break the connection to resist SPA. There are three approaches to counter the attack. (1) The first one uses the indistinguishable elliptic curve addition and doubling in the scalar multiplication [9] in order to mask the difference of operations. In the case of prime fields, Hesse and Jacobi form elliptic curves achieve the indistinguishability by using the common formula for both an addition and a doubling [19] , [25] . Because of the specialty of these curves, they are not compatible to standardized curves in [3] , [12] , [36] . For standard Weierstrass form elliptic curves, Bellezza and BrierJoye proposed indistinguishable addition formulas [4] , [5] . However, the drawback of their formulas is the computing speed. (2) The second one is the add-and-double-always method which masks the dependency between the scalar and the side channel information by inserting dummy operations [7] . Alg. 2 shows an example. In Alg. 2, both an ECDBL and an ECADD are computed in Step 3, 4 for every bit. Thus the trace of power consumption makes a fixed pattern and an attacker cannot obtain any information on the secret
Alg. 2 Add-and-double-always method.
key. (3) The last countermeasure is the Montgomery ladder (Alg. 3) [28] , which essentially resists SPA [5] , [10] , [17] , [31] . We will improve this ladder later.
SPA-Resistance to DPA-Resistance
DPA uses not only a simple power trace but also a statistic analysis, which has been captured by several executions of SPA [23] . An SPA-resistant scheme is not always DPAresistant. Coron pointed out that some parameters should be randomized in order to resist DPA [7] . The randomization enhances an SPA-resistant scheme to be DPA-resistant easily.
Coron proposed three countermeasures against DPA [7] . Okeya-Sakurai showed the bias in his 1st and 2nd countermeasures and asserted that Coron's 3rd method is secure enough [33] . A key idea of Coron's 3rd countermeasure is to randomize the representation of a base point P = (X : Y : Z) in the projective coordinates using the relationship (X : Y : Z) = (rX : rY : rZ) for r ∈ K.
The other countermeasure was proposed by JoyeTymen [20] , which uses an isomorphism of an elliptic curve. A base point P = (X : Y : Z) and coefficients a, b of the curve can be randomized in its isomorphic classes like (r 2 X : r 3 Y : Z) and r 4 a, r 6 b, respectively. An advantage of the Joye-Tymen's method is that the Z-coordinate of the base point can be chosen as 1 and therefore it improves the efficiency of scalar multiplications.
Address-Bit DPA
In 1999, Messerges et al. proposed a new variant of DPA against common key cryptosystems, the address bit DPA (ADPA), which analyzes a correlation between the secret information and addresses of registers [29] . Then, in 2002, Itoh et al. extended the attack to ECC [13] . Itoh et al. also proposed an efficient countermeasure against ADPA [14] .
Montgomery-Type Scalar Multiplication
This section describes another addition formula which only requires the x-coordinates of points, and another addition chain suitable for this addition formula. The x-coordinateonly addition formula, which computes the x-coordinate of P 1 + P 2 or 2 * P 1 from the x-coordinates of P 1 , P 2 , was originally introduced by Montgomery to enhance the efficiency of the integer factorization algorithm [28] . However, he only discussed on the special form (Montgomery form) of elliptic Table 2 Computing times of xECADD and xECDBL.
curves. The x-coordinate-only addition formula for Weierstrass form was studied by Brier-Joye and Izu-Takagi independently [5] , [17] , in order to establish an SCA-resistant scalar multiplication.
Addition Formula
Let E be an elliptic curve defined by Weierstrass form equation (1) and
Then we obtain the following relations from a standard formulas:
On the other hand, for P 4 = 2 * P 1 = (x 4 , y 4 ), we have
Thus the x-coordinates of P 3 and P 4 can be computed just form the x-coordinates of P 1 , P 2 , P 3 . We call these formulas as the x-coordinate-only addition formulas, and we write xECADD for additions and xECDBL for the doubling. In order to compute the x-coordinate-only formulas efficiently, the projective coordinate system offers faster computations. We call the computation of (2), (3), (4) as xECADD mul , xECADD add ,xECDBL, respectively. Concrete algorithms for computing these formulas are in the appendix (Alg. A· 1, A· 2, A· 3). We summarize computing times of xECADD mul , xECADD add , xECDBL in Table 2 . Here, we assume that the Z-coordinate Z 3 is equal to 1. The number of the auxiliary variables of these formulas are only 6 although the standard addition formulas require 7.
Addition Chain
When we compute an addition P 1 +P 2 with the x-coordinateonly formula, we need the difference P 3 = P 1 − P 2 as an input. This is why another addition chain Alg. 3, rather than Alg. 1, or Alg. 2 is needed. The chain is proposed by Montgomery [28] . For each bit
Step 3 and
We prove the correctness of our proposed algorithm in the following.
Theorem 1 Alg. 3, on input a point P and an integer d > 2,
outputs the correct value of the scalar multiplication d * P.
Alg. 3 Montgomery ladder (SPA resistant).
Proof When we write Q[0], Q[1], it means that Q[0] in
Step 5 and Q [1] in Step 6 of Alg. 3 in the following. The loop of Step 2 generates a sequence
by the induction for the number of the sequence. For n = 2 we have only one loop in Step 3 and we have two
Next, we prove that Remark 1 Alg. 3 does not depend on the representation of elliptic curves, and moreover it is applicable to execute a modular exponentiation in any abelian group. Therefore the RSA cryptosystem, the DSA, the ElGamal cryptosystem can use our proposed algorithm.
y-Coordinate Recovering
The output of a scalar multiplication with the x-coordinateonly formulas is only the x-coordinate of d * P. This may be enough for some cryptographic applications such as a key exchange scheme and an encryption/decryption scheme, but other applications also require the y-coordinate of d * P such as the verification of a signature scheme [36] . For the latter purposes, y-coordinate of d * P must be recovered. It is easily computed from x, y, x d , x d+1 where P = (x, y),
and y d is recovered from this equation. The concrete algorithm is in the appendix (Alg. A· 4). The computing time for
(including a conversion to the affine coordinate). Note that in contrast to the addition formulas, the y-recovering formula is executed only one time in the end of the scalar multiplication.
Security Consideration
We discuss the security of Alg. 3 against SCA in this section. First, we show Alg. 3 is secure against SPA by comparing Alg. 2, which is commonly believed to be secure against SPA [33] . [2] . We can modify the steps as follows:
SWAP is a function to swap two variables. Only
Step S1 depends on d [i] . If the power to execute SWAP is negligible, Alg. 3 is as secure as Alg. 2 against SPA.
Next, an SPA-resistant scheme can be converted to a DPA-resistant scheme using Coron's 3rd or the JoyeTymen's countermeasure as we discussed in the previous section. Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Alg. 3 with Coron's 3rd or Joye-Tymen's countermeasure is as secure as Alg. 2 against DPA, if we use a computing architecture whose swapping power of two variables is negligible.
It is possible to implement the swapping of two variables in hardware using a few logic gates. Its power is usually negligible. In software we can implement it just to swap two pointer assignments. The swapping of the pointer assignments in software can be executed in several clocks, whose time or power trace is negligible. Therefore, our proposed method is secure against DPA in many computing environments.
Improvements of Montgomery-Type Scalar Multiplication
In this section, we propose three techniques to improve the computing times of the scalar multiplication based on the x-coordinate-only formulas, and give a comparison to previous methods.
Addition Formula
In the Montgomery ladder (Alg. 3), both xECADD and xECDBL are always computed for every bit d [i] . If we encapsulate xECADD and xECDBL into one formula, say xECADDDBL, their intermediate variables may be shared and the efficiency may be reduced. Indeed, with our formula xECADD add and xECDBL, we can construct a faster formula xECADDDBL which outputs a pair of points (P 1 + P 2 , 2 * P 1 ) on input a pair of points (P 1 , P 2 ). Similarly, we can construct another version of xECADDDBL based on xECADD mul and xECDBL however the efficiency did not improved. Formulas for xECADD add and xECDBL in the projective coordinate system are as follows:
By multiplying Z 4 2 ( 0) to both denominator and numerator of (7), we obtain
are computed in (6), the intermediate variables in xECADD add and xECDBL are shared, if we encapsulate them into one new formula xECADDDBL. This new function computes a pair of ordered points (P 1 + P 2 , 2 * P 1 ) on input a pair of ordered points (P 1 , P 2 ). A similar function, which outputs (P 1 + P 2 , 2 * P 2 ) is easily constructed by inputting (P 2 , P 1 ). We show the concrete algorithms for xECADDDBL in the appendix (Alg. A· 5). The computing time for xECADDDBL is 13M + 4S under the assumption Z 3 = 1, while the total time of xECADD add and xECDBL is 14M + 5S and the time for xECADDDBL a=−3 is 11M + 4S under the assumption Z 3 = 1, while the total time of xECADD add a=−3 and xECDBL a=−3 is 12M + 5S .
Addition Chain
An addition by the x-coordinate-only formula requires an extra input P 3 = P 1 − P 2 in order to compute P 1 + P 2 . This is same for our xECADDDBL. In the Montgomery ladder, P 3 is fixed as P 3 = P. Thus we need three points (P 1 , P 2 , P) for xECADDDBL to compute (P 1 + P 2 , 2 * P 1 ). On the other hand, we need (P 2 , P 1 , −P) to compute (P 1 + P 2 , 2 * P 2 ) because P 2 − P 1 = −P. However, in the projective coordinate X(−P) = X(P) and Z(−P) = Z(P) hold and we do not have to change P into −P. Namely, we have xECADDDBL(P 1 , P 2 , P) = (P 1 + P 2 , 2 * P 1 ) and xECADDDBL(P 2 , P 1 , P) = (P 1 + P 2 , 2 * P 2 ) if a base point P is represented in the projective coordinates. The Montgomery ladder is modified our xECADDDBL as in Alg. 4.
Here 
Security Analysis
Let us discuss the security of our formula xECADDDBL with the modified Montgomery ladder (Alg. 4). Alg. 4 always computes xECADDDBL for each bit d [i] . The sequence of side channel information, which is obtained by the operations of the base field K has a fixed pattern and are independent from the bit d [i] . Thus our algorithm is resistant against SPA.
Against DPA, we adopt the countermeasures by Coron or Joye-Tymen described in Section 3.2. In Alg. 4, we use a base point P in two ways, namely as a multiplier of a scalar multiplication and as a fixed difference P 3 . OkeyaMiyazaki-Sakurai observed that the security of the Montgomery ladder combined with Coron's countermeasure [32] and they claimed that it is secure if a multiplier is randomized. Thus we have no need to randomize the difference
Alg. 4 Improved Montgomery ladder. Table 3 Computing times of a scalar multiplication.
Algorithm
Coordinate Countermeasure Computing Time (SPA-resistant) System against DPA Total n = 160 Alg. 1'
Joye-Tymen (13n + 14)M + (4n + 3)S + 1I 2638. 4M and we can assume that the Z-coordinate of the difference is 1. This observation has an implication in the point of efficiency. Thus, we have the following theorem. Remark 2 Add-and-double-always methods including Alg. 3 and Alg. 4 are vulnerable to ADPA [13] . However, since these methods are easily enhanced to ADPA-resistant [14] and we do not consider ADPA for simplicity.
Comparison
We show the improvement of our scalar multiplication algorithms proposed in this section by comparing them with previously reported algorithms. Coron's 3rd or Joye-Tymen's randomization is used in order to intensify the security of the compared schemes against DPA. We estimate the total running time of calculating a scalar multiplication d * P = (x d , y d ) including the overhead of these randomizations. The inputs for the scalar multiplication are the scalar d, the base points P = (x, y), and the system parameters of elliptic curves (a, b, p). The timings are measured in terms of the numbers of the arithmetic in the definition field, i.e., the multiplication M, the squaring S , the inverse I. In the estimation, we also exhibit the running times for the 160-bit ECC under the assumptions 1S = 0.8M and 1I = 30M [33] .
In Table 3 , we summarize the estimated running time, where n is the bit-length of the security parameter of ECC. The modified Montgomery ladder (Alg. 4) using Formula xECADDDBL with Coron's randomization is the fastest of all scalar multiplications ((13n + 7)M + (4n + 1)S + 1I). The improvement of the proposed algorithm from its based algorithm Alg. 3 is about 33% for 160-bit cases. Previously fastest multiplication was the method in [20] ((12n − 4)M + (9n−6)S +1I). For a 160-bit scalar case, the improvement of the proposed algorithm is about 18%. In the case of a = −3 we further improve the efficiency of our scalar multiplication. The computing time of xECADDDBL a=−3 combined with Coron's countermeasure is reduced to (11n + 9)M + (4n + In order to demonstrate the efficiency of our algorithm, we implemented our modified Montgomery ladder with Coron's randomization algorithm and Alg. 1' with JoyeTymen's randomization on a Celeron 500 MHz using the LiDIA library [LiDIA] . In Table 4 we show the timings for 162-bit ECC. It should be emphasized here that our implementation was not optimized for cryptographic purposesit is only intended to provide a comparison. The improvement is about 34%.
Scalar Multiplication with SIMD Operations
In this section we propose fast SCA-resistant scalar multiplication algorithm using SIMD operations. The Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) architecture is a kind of parallel computation on a single processor. SIMD architecture consists of several process units and a common shared memory. Nowadays SIMD is so common technology that it is implemented on major CPUs such as Pentium 4 (SSE2), Athlon (3DNow!) and SPARC (VIS). SIMD operations has been applied to achieve fast elliptic curve computations. For examples, Smart proposed a 3-parallel SIMD-type addition formula on a certain form of elliptic curves [35] . Aoki et al. proposed efficient algorithms for computing standard addition formulas using SIMD operations [1] .
SIMD architecture is thought to be hard to be realized on smart cards because of its less computational power. Infineon developed an arithmetic coprocessor CRYPTO2000 for smart cards [10] . The CRYPTO2000 has two modes: RSA mode and ECC mode. In ECC mode, the coprocessor is divided into two parallel units and computes the base field arithmetic with SIMD operations. It articulates a way for processing SIMD operation on smart cards. The processor CRYPTO2000 enables us to implement a parallel SCAresistant scalar multiplication with SIMD operations.
Izu-Takagi firstly utilized SIMD operations in order to establish SCA-resistant algorithms [17] . However, their method is based on the MIMD (Multiple Instructions, Multiple Data) architecture rather than SIMD, which is harder to be implemented on smart cards. They also proposed another algorithms for scalar multiplications based on window methods [18] , which is not suitable restricted devices. On the other hand, Fischer et al. proposed an SPA-resistant scalar multiplication on the CRYPTO2000 [10] . Their algorithm requires 10M + 7A computations per one bit with 8 auxiliary variables.
In this section we optimize our xECADDDBL for implementation with SIMD. The algorithm requires 7M +2S +8A per a bit with 8 auxiliary variables. We also propose the optimized algorithms with SIMD operations for the precomputation and the post-computation algorithm, which makes the scheme to be SCA-resistant and recovers the ycoordinate of the final value. Note that parallelization is highly depend on the algorithm and the improvement of the efficiency is not obvious. For example, if an algorithm outputs α 2 β on input α, β, we require two multiplication without SIMD. But even in the parallelized computation, we have to compute two multiplications independently and there is no computational advantage in parallel.
Proposed Algorithms
In this section we describe the proposed algorithm on SIMD operation. In order to describe the proposed scheme we follow the two assumptions. (1) Resisters used for the auxiliary variables of the addition formulas are shared by two process units. (2) We cannot change the value of certain register if it is being worked by the other process unit. Furthermore we assume that parameters of the elliptic curve are fixed as the system parameter.
There are three stages in the scalar multiplication of elliptic curves, namely the pre-computation stage, the main loop stage, and the post-computation stage. We convert the operations in each stage to the parallel computation respectively.
At first we explain the pre-computation stage. In the x-coordinate-only addition formula in section 4, the precomputation consists of the randomization as a countermeasure against DPA and a doubling of a base point. We only discuss the algorithm with Coron's 3rd randomization, because the scheme with Joye-Tymen's randomization is similar but slightly slower than Coron's case. We compute a randomized point P = (rx :: r) for random value r ∈ K. Then we proceed xECDBL(P) in order to obtain the initial values of two registers for the main loop P = (X 3 :: Z 3 ), 2P = (X 4 :: Z 4 ). From the formulas X 4 = (X , we obtain the following relationships:
which is suitable for our optimization. The concrete algorithm, called SIMD Pre Computation, is described in the following. SIMD Pre Computation can be computed in 3M + 2S + 4A with SIMD operations. The number of auxiliary variables is 7. We assume that the random integer r is stored in one of the auxiliary variables. Next let us discuss the parallelization of the main loop. We convert algorithm xECADDDBL to the parallelized computation with SIMD operations. Our strategy for optimization is straight-forward. We allocate computations, whose value is needed later, earlier in the algorithm. Then we establish a parallelized algorithm with the computing time7M + 2S + 8A with 8 auxiliary variables. The concrete algorithm, called SIMD xECADDDBL, is described in the following. In the post-computation stage, we have to recover the Y-coordinate and draw them back to the affine coordinate. We parallelize Y-Recovering and the conversion to the affine coordinate as one procedure with SIMD operations. The concrete algorithm, called SIMD Post Computation is described in the following. The computing time of SIMD Post Computation is (5M + 1I + 4A) + (2M + 1S ) = 7M + 1S + 1I + 4A and the number of auxiliary variables is 8.
Security Analysis
Let us analyze the security of our parallelized version of xECADDDBL against SPA. As we adopted the improved Montgomery ladder (Alg. 3), a pattern of traces of power consumption is fixed. An attacker cannot obtain any information on a secret key. Against DPA, countermeasures by Coron or Joye-Tymen randomize the data and thus the attacker cannot simulate the computation. Moreover, the power consumption is a combination of those of two units in our parallelized algorithm. There are less dependency between the secret key and the power trace than the algorithm without SIMD operations. These observations assure the security of our scheme.
Suppose an attacker can obtain each power consumption of units, namely one processor unit or a part of each processor unit. Nevertheless, our scheme is secure enough against side channel attacks, because each processor produces a fixed pattern of traces of power consumption and the intermediate data are randomized by countermeasures of Coron or Joye-Tymen. On the contrary, if the attacker can obtain the (partial) information on the secret key by observing one of the units, the attack should be extended to the computation without SIMD operations. We claim that our scheme is as secure as the previous SCA-resistant algorithms compared in this paper. Thus we have the following theorem: 
Comparison
We compare the efficiency of several SCA-resistant scalar multiplication algorithms with SIMD operations in [17] , which is based on MIMD operations. Note that the algorithm by Aoki et al. cannot combined with Coron's countermeasure because the algorithm assumes Z = 1. The asterisk means that the computing times are estimated without additions A. But we assume that the computing times for additions is negligible for the 160-bit ECC (n = 160).
As in the table, our proposed method is the fastest among all, and the efficiency improvement over the scheme proposed by Fischer et al. is about 16% for n = 160.
Concluding Remarks
We discussed the scalar multiplications based on the xcoordinate-only addition formulas xECADD and xECDBL. The proposed scalar multiplication can be calculated using the Montgomery ladder (Alg. 3), which computes both xECADD and xECDBL for each bit of the scalar, and thus the security against the SCA can be achieved. Moreover, we encapsulated the two addition formulas xECADD and xECDBL into one formula xECADDDBL, which yields a faster computation, because the encapsulation deduces auxiliary valuables required for the former formulas. We developed the novel addition chain (Alg. 4) for the new addition formula, which allows us to compute the scalar multiplication secure against SCA. The efficiency improvement of our scheme over the Coron's dummy operation method is about 18% for a 160-bit scalar. The proposed scalar multiplication can be applied to all curves over the prime fields, e.g., any standardized curves over finite field with characteristic larger than 3. We also optimized our proposed algorithm for SIMD operation. Compared with the scheme by Fischer et al., our proposed scheme is 16% faster. Alg. A· 3 Algorithm for xECDBL. 
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